



**Managing team dynamics in routine and crisis situations: Evidence-based strategies**

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**Agenda**



- Some context
  - Teamwork and the US healthcare system
- What determines team effectiveness?
- How do we get better teamwork?
- How do we encourage team self-regulation?
- How do teams manage non-routine events?

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
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**The Patient Safety Journey**



Institute of Medicine report *To Err is Human*  
 •98,000 lives a year lost due to preventable medical errors

Report from the Office of the Inspector General, DHHS  
 •13.5% of CMS beneficiaries **experienced adverse events** during hospitalization  
 •Estimated cost of **15,000 lives** and **\$324 million per month**



2000      Abbreviated Patient Safety Timeline      2010

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### Why are we here?

JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICINE

Dunbar's Number:  
We have a maximum of ~150 meaningful personal relationships

~18 people you know well will be admitted to the hospital each year

People you know admitted to the hospital

People you know

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### Why are we here?

JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICINE

Between 2 and 3 people you know will be harmed by medical error each year

Over the course of four years, someone you know will die from medical error

People you know harmed by their care

People you know admitted to the hospital

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### What role does communication and teamwork play?

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- 70-80% of sentinel events<sup>1</sup>
- Twice as many preventable deaths as issues of technical competency<sup>2</sup>
- ~30% of all communication events in the OR were failures<sup>3</sup>
- ~37% of error reports in the ICU included some type of communication failure between nurses and physicians<sup>4</sup>
- Lack of communication was the most frequently occurring 'behavioral failure' in a review of closed claims against surgeons<sup>6</sup>

1Joint Commission, 2006, 2011      4Donchin et al, 1995  
2Wilson et al., 1995                      5Gawande et al., 2003  
3Lingard et al., 2004                      6Griffen et al., 2008

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
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
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
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
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
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### Do teamwork interventions work in healthcare?

- Learner reactions are positive<sup>1,2</sup>
- Learning occurs<sup>1,2</sup>
- Behavior change in transfer environment occurs<sup>1,2</sup>
- Safety culture improves<sup>2</sup>
- Improved efficiency and effectiveness of clinical processes<sup>3-6</sup>
- Improved clinical outcomes<sup>7,8</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Rabal et al., 2010    <sup>5</sup>Capella et al., 2010  
<sup>2</sup>Weaver et al., 2010    <sup>6</sup>Deering et al., 2011  
<sup>3</sup>Siassakos et al., 2009; <sup>4</sup>Mann et al., 2006  
<sup>7</sup>Wolf et al., 2010    <sup>8</sup>Neily et al., 2010

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
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**But... It's a tough crowd / transfer environment** 



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graph TD; A[Teamwork Intervention] --> B[Patient Outcomes]; C[Safety Culture] --> AB[moderates];
```

- Safety culture moderates the effectiveness of teamwork improvement efforts
  - Safety climate scores correlated with the degree of reduction in mortality and morbidity achieved in the implementation of a surgical team checklist ( $r = .71, p < .05$ )

Haynes et al., 2011 Armstrong Institute for Patient Safety and Quality 13

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## HOW DO WE GET BETTER TEAMWORK?

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**The Science of Teams & Team Training** 



- Common set of **teamwork competencies**
- Diagnostic **measurement** → Needs **analysis & feedback**
- **Methods** of delivery: Practice matters, a lot
- Ongoing **coaching**, social leadership, and peer learning
- Organizational **context** and **transfer** environments matter

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### Train & Coach Adaptive Team Behaviors

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- **Leadership**
  - Delegation
  - Resource management
  - Modeling good teamwork skills
- **Communication**
  - Closed-loop communication
  - Using clear, structured communication
- **Mutual Support**
  - Task assistance
  - Conflict resolution
  - Feedback
- **Situation Monitoring**
  - Shared mental models
  - Cross-monitoring
- **Team Structure**
  - Role clarity

**TeamSTEPPS® Competency Framework**  
Teamstepps.ahrq.gov

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### Improving Teamwork through Training & Education

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**Exclusive TEAMWORK Focus** (Left Y-axis)  
**Blended TEAMWORK / TASKWORK Focus** (Right Y-axis)

**Separate from work** (Bottom X-axis)  
**Integrated with work** (Top X-axis)

Key components and strategies shown:

- Adaptive Teamwork Strategy** (top-left)
- Procedural Teamwork Strategy** (bottom-right)
- Learning environments: Classroom, Sim Center, In Situ Sim, On the Job
- Activities: General principles, Guided learning, Facilitated debriefing, Self-regulating teams, Deliberate Practice, Perf. Assmt.

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### The role of in situ simulation

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#### Why Simulate?

- **Individual & Team Level:**
  - Learning / training
- **Unit Level:**
  - Prospective hazard identification and mitigation
- **System Level:**
  - Needs analysis & research

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**An Example: Mobile Obstetric Emergencies Simulator (MOES)** 

- Standardized simulators, curriculum (teamwork & technical), and debrief process.
- Implemented in every L&D unit in the DoD (> 50 sites)
- 10 key obstetric emergencies
  - E.g., shoulder dystocia, postpartum hem., eclampsia, cord prolapse

Deering, S., Rosen, M. A., Salas, E., & King, H. B. (2009). Building team and technical competency for obstetric emergencies: The Mobile Obstetric Emergency Simulator (MOES) System. *Simulation in Healthcare*, 4(3), 166.





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**An Example: Mobile Obstetric Emergencies Simulator (MOES)** 

- Debrief and Measurement Tool
- Observers & Learners Ratings of:
  - Team performance
  - Technical performance
  - Systems issues
  - Training eval. items




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**MOES Trends: Teamwork and System Performance** 

- 2558 ratings of performance at 32 L&D wards on 3 continents using 10 scenario types, representing 260 learning activities.

	Location	Scenario Type	Location X Scenario Type
Overall Teamwork R <sup>2</sup> = .64	F(30, 1884) = 8.70 partial η <sup>2</sup> = .247	F(8, 1884) = 5.39 partial η <sup>2</sup> = .051	F(8, 1884) = 3.05 partial η <sup>2</sup> = .202
Response Time R <sup>2</sup> = .62	F(30, 1870) = 7.76 partial η <sup>2</sup> = .228	F(8, 1870) = 3.31 partial η <sup>2</sup> = .033	F(65, 1870) = 2.74 partial η <sup>2</sup> = .184

p < .01 for all

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### Local context $\approx$ 25% of variance

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**Where is that coming from?**

- Culture?
- Policies or management practices?
- Physical design of facility?
- Equipment availability and location?
- Communication structures?

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### Local context x Emergency Type $\approx$ 20% of variance

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**Where is that coming from?**

- Unique teamwork, technical, and systems demands of dealing with different types of emergencies.

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## HOW DO WE ENCOURAGE TEAM SELF-REGULATION?

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## Team reflective practices



- Debriefing
- Learning from Communication Failures
- Team Interaction Mirror

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## The Armstrong Institute Model to Improve Care



Translating Evidence Into Practice (TRiP)	Reducing Surgical Site Infections	Comprehensive Unit based Safety Program (CUSP)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Summarize the evidence in a checklist</li> <li>2. Identify local barriers to implementation</li> <li>3. Measure performance</li> <li>4. Ensure all patients get the evidence                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Engage</li> <li>• Educate</li> </ul> </li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Emerging Evidence</li> <li>• Local Opportunities to Improve</li> <li>• Collaborative learning</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Educate staff on science of safety</li> <li>2. Identify defects</li> <li>3. Assign executive to adopt unit</li> <li>4. Learn from one defect per quarter</li> <li>5. Implement teamwork tools</li> </ol>
Technical Work		Adaptive Work

[http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/armstrong\\_institute](http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/armstrong_institute)

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## CUSP & Teamwork



- **Teamwork tools:**
  - Handoffs
  - Briefings / Debriefings
  - Call list
  - Daily goals
  - AM briefing / huddle
  - Shadowing
  - Cross unit collaboration
  - *Learning from defects\**

Comprehensive Unit based Safety Program (CUSP)

1. Educate staff on science of safety
2. Identify defects
3. Assign executive to adopt unit
4. Learn from one defect per quarter
5. Implement teamwork tools

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### Learning from Communication Failures



1. **Description:** What happened?
2. **Diagnosis:** Why did it happen?
3. **Intervention:** What is the best approach for addressing the underlying problems?
4. **Evaluation:** How do you know the underlying problems were fixed?

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
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### Descriptive Framework



• The basic elements...




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### Content: What were people communicating about?



Descriptive Questions <i>What happened?</i>	Diagnostic Questions <i>Why was it happening?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Was communication about the patient status, background, and basic clinical information?</li> <li>• Was the communication about the plan of care?</li> <li>• Was the communication about material resources or coordination with other units, services, or specialists?</li> <li>• Was the communication about staff resources?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Was information omitted, incomplete, incorrect, or untimely? (<i>communication slip or lapse</i>)</li> <li>• Was information transferred, but misunderstood in terms of meaning or accountability for acting on the information? (<i>communication mistake</i>)</li> <li>• Was information transferred and understood, but actively dismissed? (<i>communication violation</i>)</li> </ul>

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### People: Who was involved in the communication?

Descriptive Questions <i>What happened?</i>	Diagnostic Questions <i>Why was it happening?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How many people were involved?</li> <li>• What were their...                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Roles (in general and in this situation)?</li> <li>○ Expertise types and levels?</li> <li>○ Status?</li> <li>○ Familiarity with others and the context?</li> <li>○ History and existing relationships with other participants?</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did the size of the group or length of the communication 'chain' corrupt the message?</li> <li>• Did unclear roles and responsibilities interfere with information transfer or understanding?</li> <li>• Were the right parties involved? Or, was the right information going to the wrong people?</li> <li>• Were there differences (or assumptions about differences) in expertise types or levels that led to misunderstandings?</li> <li>• Were there differences in status or power?</li> <li>• Was there interpersonal conflict between participants?</li> </ul>

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### Channel / Mode: How were people communicating?

Descriptive Questions <i>What happened?</i>	Diagnostic Questions <i>Why was it happening?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were people communicating...                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Face to face?</li> <li>○ Synchronously distributed?                                     <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ phone, chat</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Asynchronously distributed?                                     <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Email, paging, electronic records, paper records, cognitive artifacts</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were asynchronous modes of communication not updated quickly enough?</li> <li>• Were there usability or accessibility issues with information systems contributing to the error (difficulty finding or reading information, inappropriate alerts)?</li> <li>• Did environmental factors interfere with face to face communication?</li> <li>• Did communication technology otherwise interfere with completeness of information or interpretation?</li> <li>• Was the channel used appropriate for the type of communication?</li> </ul>

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### Context: What was the situation and environment surrounding the communication?

Descriptive Questions <i>What happened?</i>	Diagnostic Questions <i>Why was it happening?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What was the environment like where communication was occurring?</li> <li>• What was happening with the patient when the communication failure occurred?</li> <li>• Were there other major events occurring at the time of the error?</li> <li>• Were there workload or staffing issues?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did high workload, distractions, or other competing attentional demands interfere with effective communication?</li> <li>• Did environmental issues such as noise levels or the physical design of the facility interfere with effective communication?</li> <li>• Did patient flow issues such as direct admissions contribute to communication breakdowns?</li> <li>• Did a shift change, location change, or transition of care interfere with communication?</li> </ul>

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**Purpose: Why were people communicating?** 

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<b>Descriptive Questions</b> <i>What happened?</i>	<b>Diagnostic Questions</b> <i>Why was it happening?</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• What goals was each of the participants attempting to achieve with the communication?</li><li>• What were other critical goals being pursued?</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Did participants have different or conflicting goals for the interaction?</li><li>• Did participants have competing priorities that directly impacted communication?</li></ul>

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
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**Team Interaction Mirror.**  
*A work in progress.*



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**Reflective practice summary** 

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**TEAMWORK IN NON-ROUTINE EVENTS**

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**Commonsense Understandings of Team Cognition** 

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 Winning is about having the whole team on the same page.  
*-Bill Walton*

If everyone is thinking alike, then somebody isn't thinking.  
*-George Patton* 

← Homogeneity of Cognition      Heterogeneity of Cognition →

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### Rule-based Performance in Teams JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICINE

<p><b>Stable / routine task inputs</b></p>	<p><b>Individual + Team cognition</b> <i>M = Meaning-making</i></p>	<p><b>Drivers of Effectiveness</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shared (compatible) mental models</li> <li>• Information exchange</li> </ul> <p><b>Adaptive Capacity</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ability to detect and correct deviations from normal/optimal</li> </ul> <p><b>Implications for Meas.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mental model quality</li> <li>• Information exchange quality</li> <li>• Accuracy, timeliness, clarity, structure</li> </ul>
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### Knowledge-based Performance in Teams JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICINE

<p><b>Unstable / novel task inputs</b></p>	<p><b>Individual + Team cognition</b> <i>M = Meaning-making</i></p>	<p><b>Drivers of Effectiveness</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Diverse expertise types / levels</li> <li>• Explicit knowledge building at team level</li> </ul> <p><b>Adaptive Capacity</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Effectively combining diverse expertise types and levels to generate new knowledge</li> </ul> <p><b>Implications for Meas.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Distribution &amp; congruence of knowledge structures</li> <li>• More complex processes</li> </ul>
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### Knowledge-based performance in teams: A simulation study JOHNS HOPKINS MEDICINE

<p><b>Team Knowledge Building Processes</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Information Exchange</li> <li>– Knowledge Sharing</li> <li>– Solution Option Generation</li> <li>– Option Evaluation</li> <li>– Process and Plan Regulation</li> </ul> <p><b>Information vs. Knowledge:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Information</b> = basic task information, no context added</li> <li>• <b>Knowledge</b> = integration of information, value judgments, context added</li> </ul> <p><small>Fiore, Rosen, Salas, Smith-Jentsch, Letsky, &amp; Warner, 2010</small></p>	
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
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## Study Design / Methods



- **Study design**
  - Single group correlational design (model building)
- **Task**
  - Strategic planning simulation
  - Diverse *individual level* 'expertise'
- **Participants**
  - 69 three person teams
- **Communication analysis**
  1. Transcription
  2. Unitization (≈ 30,000 conversational units)
  3. Coding (kappa = .7)

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Time - Min/Sec	Role	Utterance/Action	Codes
14:00	Air	Or B4f sorry not B4h.	IP
14:02	Personnel/Supply	And then	INC/F/EX
<b>Main Communication Coding Variables</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Information exchange</li> <li>2. Knowledge sharing</li> <li>3. Option generation</li> <li>4. Option evaluation</li> <li>5. Regulation</li> <li>6. Acknowledgements</li> </ol>			SU/R
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			SU/R
			SU/R
			OG-P
			IP
			OG-P
			KP
			Seval
			KP
			OG-P
			OG-P
			KR
			S
			KR
			S
			IR

**Functional Analysis**

- How much process did the team devote to each task function?
- Multiple regression analysis looking for unique effects of each process variable

**Sequential Analysis**

- What patterns of interaction characterize high and low performers?
- Multi-way frequency analysis looking at transition

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## Information Exchange and Knowledge Sharing



- **No significant overall relationship between the amount of information exchange and performance**
  - But, after controlling for acknowledgements...
- **High performing teams shared LESS information.**
  - Negative linear relationship after controlling for acknowledgements ( $\beta = -.323, p < .05$ )
    - $F(2,66) = 7.119, p < .01, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .153$
- **High performing teams shared MORE knowledge.**
  - Positive linear relationship ( $\beta = .324, p < .05$ )
    - $F(3,65) = 5.215, p < .01, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .195$

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### Option Generation and Evaluation

- **Option generation was only useful if accompanied by Evaluation**
  - Significant interaction ( $\beta = -.368, p < .05$ )
    - $F(5,46) = 4.029, p = .01, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .248$

TENA Level	Low TSGO (Mean z score)	High TSGO (Mean z score)
Low	-0.005	-0.22
High	0.15	0.25

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### Regulation

- **Moderately performing teams engaged in MORE regulation than high or low performing teams.**
  - Negative curvilinear (inverted U) relationship ( $\beta = -1.204, p < .05$ )
    - $F(2,66) = 3.550, p < .05, \text{Adjusted } R^2 = .070$
  - Need future research to fully explain
    - Potentially moderated by goal / role clarity
  - Implications for measurement: Levels of process are not enough to determine effectiveness

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